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As a political slogan, and a guideline in times of crisis, ‘whatever it takes’
undoubtedly has enormous appeal, and may in certain circumstances justify novel
and untried forms of action. However, in a polity governed by the rule of law, there
are limits to this approach which, if not respected, may cause greater problems than
those which provoked the action in the first place.
In his Verfassungsblog post of 19 May 2020, ‘The Last Chance Saloon’, Dr John
Cotter proposes a device to overcome the current impasse in the application of the
Union’s procedure to sanction Hungary’s ‘flagrant disregard’ of the Union’s values,
in particular, respect for democracy. He suggests that the European Council and
Council could, and should, exclude the representatives of the Hungarian government
from their meetings, on the ground that it is not ‘democratically accountable either
to [its] national Parliament or to [its] citizens’, as required by Article 10(2) TEU. No
sooner was the ink dry (or whatever the online equivalent is) on this post than it
was being hailed as ‘brilliant’ by a respected expert on rule of law matters in the
course of a (be it said in passing, excellent) webinar, hosted by none other than
Verfassungsblog. 
Cotter prefaces his post by recalling his reaction to another ‘whatever it takes’
proposal, this time by Professor Christopher Hillion. Drawing on Brexit law, Hillion
suggests that Poland and Hungary’s current approach to rule of law matters could
be deemed an implicit notification of their intention to withdraw from the Union. In
Cotter’s view, however, Hillion’s proposal is ‘doctrinally unsound and … would have
a chaotic and counterproductive outcome’. I would respectfully suggest that the
same could be said of his own proposal.
It is difficult to see what political advantage would realistically be gained by
ostracising representatives of the Hungarian government. It would dilute the political
incentive to exploit other, more plausible and probably more effective, Treaty
mechanisms to tackle this regrettable situation; one such would be introducing rule
of law conditionality for certain payments out of the Union budget, which would then
potentially apply to all Member States, rather than targeting just one. Given its shaky
legal foundations, it would also risk undermining the step-by-step approach, following
well-trodden judicial procedures, adopted by the Commission, notably in the case
of Poland. This consists in bringing in a neutral third party, the Court, to pass final
judgment on different contested actions of the Member State(s) concerned. In such
circumstances, surely the rifle is to be preferred to the blunderbuss.
The Union functions through its Member States, and it is in the Union’s own
interest that governments participate in decision-making, and take ownership of the
outcome, even where on a particular matter a government is outvoted. Excluding
a government’s representatives is a surefire way of guaranteeing that whatever
decisions are taken by the [European] Council will not be respected or implemented
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in Hungary. The interests of both EU26 and Hungarian citizens have more chance
of being upheld if Hungary retains a stake in the game than if it is sent off. Cotter’s
suggestion that his device might bring pressure on Hungary to end its state of
emergency is at best speculative; it is hard to see Mr Orbán doing other than telling
the Union authorities to mind their own business. We shouldn’t forget that the
Hungarian government’s justification for the recent emergency legislation is that it
too is doing ‘whatever it takes’ to tackle the coronavirus pandemic.
The main objections to Cotter’s proposal are, as he acknowledges, legal. To begin
with, I will cheerfully concede that Treaty provisions of an apparently declaratory
nature may, in the hands of the Court of Justice, turn out to have important legal
effects, which are often very beneficial for the rule of law. One only has to think of
the general prescription that the Court ‘ensure … the law is observed’ in Article 19(1)
TEU which the Court has used as a touchstone for interpreting, and occasionally
expanding, the scope of its powers under the Treaty. More recently, in Wightman
the Court relied heavilyon the proviso in Article 50(1) TEU that a Member State may
only decide to withdraw from the Union ‘in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements’ in order to discern an unconstrained, unilateral right for a Member
State to revoke its withdrawal notification.
Ostracising Hungarian representatives from Council meetings would be tantamount
to suspending the voting rights of the Hungarian government. But wait, is that not
exactly one of the possible outcomes of the Article 7(2) TEU procedure? To reach
such a result under this procedure would require the consent of the European
Parliament, a hearing of the Hungarian government, a unanimous decision of the
European Council (minus the Member State in the dock), and a decision of the
Council itself, which must take account of the consequences of the suspension on
the rights of individuals and businesses. Following Cotter’s suggestion would simply
airbrush out of the picture Hungary’s rights, and the corresponding obligations of the
Union institutions, under Article 7(2) TEU, as if they had never existed. Because, you
see, that is what it would take.
There is also the small matter of how such a decision could be approved by the
European Council; as its decisions ‘shall be taken by consensus’ (Article 15(4)
TEU), then logically it should follow that no such decision could ever be adopted in
practice. Even the representatives of a Member State which has decided to leave
the Union – which Cotter agrees Hungary has not – are entitled fully to participate in
the work of the European Council and the Council until withdrawal takes effect. They
are only excluded from [European] Council discussions concerning the withdrawal
process itself, and they participate in the adoption of the relevant decisions, albeit
in their own right rather than as a member of the [European] Council. This form of
exclusion, however, is based on an explicit Treaty provision (Article 50(4) TEU),
which is obviously absent from the Cotter construction.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that a coalition of the willing in the
European Council, perforce excluding any other Member State which opposes
the adoption of an Article 7(2) decision in respect of Hungary, decides that
representatives of the Hungarian government may not take part in the work of the
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European Council and the Council. As is the way of things, the question would reach
the Court sooner or later.  
Then the judicial nightmare would begin. The annulment of the ostracism decision
could, as Cotter acknowledges, undermine the validity of all the decisions of
[European] Council taken without the participation of the representatives of the
Hungarian government, which is not a great advertisement for the rule of law in
the Union. The failed attempt at exclusion would in no way persuade the Orbán
government to change its ways; au contraire, it is the Union which would be held up
as the outlaw, the Hungarian government its innocent victim.
A judgment upholding the ostracism decision, on the other hand, would feed
Mr Orbán’s ‘ECJ victimisation’ trope. Much more importantly, however, it would
overturn nearly seven decades of case law hammering home the importance of
strictly respecting procedural rights in the political activity of the Community/Union.
Procedural rules are not the playthings of the Union institutions or the Member
States, the Court taught us in its 1988 ‘Hormones’ ruling. Indeed, the Court added in
its 2001 Opinion on the Cartagena Protocol, they have ‘constitutional significance’.
Strict respect by the institutions of procedural rules is the Union’s operating system.
The consequences of a judgment sanctioning such a fundamental disregard of a
specific procedure would be incalculable; legal Y2K would happen after all. The
Union cannot solve a rule of law problem by simply ignoring the rules of law.
Collins’ dictionary provides two possible definitions of a ‘Last Chance Saloon’: ‘a
situation considered to be the last opportunity for success’, and ‘a place frequented
by unsavoury or contemptible people.’ Clearly Dr Cotter had the former in mind, but
it turns out that his suggested solution is more akin to the latter, being based on legal
reasoning which is quite unsavoury, and with political consequences which can only
inspire unease, if not outright contempt. This is one showdown the Union should stay
away from.
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